During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s state visit in January 2007, the country signed some 18 agreements on the agriculture sector with the Philippines. These efforts form part of President Arroyo’s 2004-2010 Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan agricultural target of additional two million agribusiness lands, which is expected to generate at least 2.8 million additional rural jobs. But while some non-government organizations and civil society groups criticize the concerned government agencies for not consulting the farmers first and for lack of transparency, the more fundamental issue is that the deals would further worsen landlessness, undermine genuine agrarian reform, national food security, and rural development − and these threats are imminent.
At least four of the farm deals involve government’s commitment to provide at least 1.24 million hectares for hybrid corn, hybrid rice, and hybrid sorghum farming, leasing for sugarcane and cassava plantation; demonstration farm for sweet corn, and rice and corn production, agro-tourism, and organic farming. In addition, local bioethanol producers signed four joint venture deals with Chinese partners for domestic bioethanol production that also involve hundreds of thousands of hectares of agricultural lands; and three joint venture deals on aquaculture production.
REMISS IN LAND REFORM
For the China deals, the Department of Agriculture (DA) has already identified and certified as “available for investment” at least 127,000 hectares covering 32 municipalities in five provinces for the production of sweet sorghum, rice, sugarcane, corn and cassava. Government justifies these arrangements by arguing that Chinese intervention would help improve agricultural productivity and incomes as it targets lands distributed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) but are “unproductive,” as well as alienable and disposable lands and forestlands that remain idle. So-called idle A and D lands are around 4.8 million hectares while idle forestlands that can be used for agricultural purposes are around four million hectares.
But such CARP lands should have been made productive by government as part of a comprehensive and genuine program for development of local agriculture, even without the Chinese deals. Further, if there are 8.8 million hectares of idle A and D and forestlands for production, why does landlessness remain rampant in the country despite numerous attempts at land redistribution dating back to the American colonial period? It should be noted that poverty in the country is most prevalent in the countryside, and a major cause of such poverty is the landlessness of the farmers and peasants.
These points go straight to the heart of the issue of the Chinese deals: that past and present administrations have been remiss in implementing a true agrarian reform program, that CARP is flawed and the deals will only aggravate the problem of widespread landlessness of farmers. Land reconcentration is also highly possible if these deals will be fully implemented because by experience, arrangements wherein farmers are asked to enter into production and marketing tie-ups with agribusiness corporations lead not only to farmers losing control of their lands, but losing ownership altogether.
WORSENING FOOD SECURITY
Another major concern about the deals is the possible aggravation of the country’s food security. Since the mid-1990s, the Philippines has completely turned around from being a net food exporter to a net food importer with a yearly food trade deficit of $754.7 million from 1995 to 2005. This shift is because crop conversion and land use conversion to meet the global demand for high-value crops have compromised domestic food production.
The shift to biofuels production is a continuation of this trend and, given the growing demand for biofuels, this may increase the risk of inadequate and inaccessible food supplies.
China’s rapid economic expansion makes it one of the most voracious consumers of fuel in the world and its demand for biofuels is expected to rise in the coming years. But its domestic production of biofuels is not likely to meet growing demand as it prioritizes its food supply over its need for biofuels.
This means that, for its supply, China must increasingly turn to East Asian producers such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, which enacted the Biofuels Act of 2006 to establish the needed policy environment. Thus, China is actively pursuing joint bioethanol production arrangements with Filipino firms and has taken a keen interest in developing lands that could be used to cultivate “energy crops” or crops that can be used as feedstock for biofuels.
This restructuring of domestic agriculture has already taken away all state guarantees and mechanisms to guarantee food security. In the case of the Biofuels Act, for example, there is no provision to prevent corporate growers from converting lands dedicated to food crops to large-scale bioethanol and biodiesel production for export if they find it more profitable than producing crops for domestic food consumption.
Aside from compromising domestic food supplies, the farm deals also further weaken food accessibility in the country. The massive dislocation from the means of production of farmers and fishers means increased poverty for them and their families and will seriously weaken their ability to buy their food needs.
BEHIND THE DEALS
The Philippines sees the emergence of China, as a key economic force in the East Asian region, as an opportunity to boost its domestic economic development. The country wants to tap investments from the Chinese government for much-needed capital to finance projects in agriculture, infrastructure and industry. Such projects are seen to create jobs, increase income and enhance economic activity.
China, on the other hand, is pursuing an aggressive campaign to open more export markets to sustain its economic growth, particularly in the wake of its becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It is also seeking new sources of food, mineral and fuel resources to feed its booming economy. This is the context of the dramatic increase in bilateral economic agreements between the two countries in recent years.
From only 5 agreements on trade, investment and finance from 1975 to 2000, the figure jumped to 14 from 2001 to 2007. Agreements on agriculture signed by both countries similarly increased from 6 to 21 during the same period. All in all, the two countries have forged 89 bilateral agreements on various areas from 1975 to 2007, of which 32 were signed during the state visit of Chinese Premier Wen.
A closer look at the Chinese economy shows that, since it abandoned the socialist construction in the 1970s, transnational corporations from the First World have steadily and increasingly intensified their control and domination not only of its local market but its export-import sector as well. This means that burgeoning-manufacturing-“giant” China, which in actuality still lacks a First World-type industrial base, is at the mercy of a global market dominated by the industrialized nations.
China’s aggressiveness in forging economic agreements with the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries is thus not driven simply by its agenda of increasing its influence in East Asia. In the context of the farm deals, for example, China is looking at the Philippines to meet its domestic food and energy requirements even as the Chinese economy is being restructured into an enormous assembly hub of manufactured goods for the American, Japanese and European markets. In other words, China itself, like the Philippines and other underdeveloped countries, is a victim of the distorted concept of development and industrialization imposed by First World countries.
TOWARDS A TRUE PARTNERSHIP
The country should pursue stronger “South-South” partnerships such as its bilateral relations with China because the potential for a more meaningful cooperation and mutual benefit is greater than its “North-South” relations (i.e. with the US or Japan). But such partnerships only become meaningful and mutually beneficial if they recognize common issues that beset the countries involved and, from such recognition, establish a cooperation program that aims to find a shared solution.
In the case of the Philippines and China, their common issue is that global monopoly capitalism has distorted their respective economic growth (although at varying levels, given their respective historical development) and the logical solution is to find an alternative model of economic partnership that will truly promote their industrialization. Unfortunately, closer Philippine-China relations is being built not on this premise but to allow the further exploitation of their natural and human resources by First World-based corporations in collaboration with Filipino and Chinese capitalists and landlords.
Ultimately, only the people themselves, through direct action and mobilization, can ensure that any economic agreements that the Arroyo regime enters into in their behalf would genuinely benefit them. Even if the Chinese deals were already clinched, an informed and militant public can still avert the implementation of these agreements. In the case of the farm deals, for example, the Department of Agriculture is still in the process of negotiating with farmers who may be potential “partners” of the Chinese investors in their agribusiness ventures. www.ibon.org
